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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order setting aside the
restitution order.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 23, 2013, Andrew Keys' wife reported to law enforcement that, over the
course of three years, Mr. Keys had hit her several times. (Presentence Investigation
(PSI), p.3.)

Mr. Keys told officers that Mrs. Keys initiated most of their physical

altercations, but admitted that he had caused some physical injuries to Mrs. Keys. (PSI,
p.4.) Mr. Keys was charged by Information with two counts of felony domestic battery,
one count of misdemeanor domestic battery, and one count of felony domestic battery
in the presence of a child. (R., pp.24-27.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement binding on all parties and the district court
pursuant to I.C.R. 11 (f)(1 )(C), Mr. Keys pied guilty to one count of felony domestic
battery and the remaining counts were dismissed. (9/27/13 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.1 O;
R., pp.28-38.)

As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Mr. Keys'

judgment would be withheld and he would be on probation for three years. (9/27 /13 Tr.,
p.1, L.15- p.3, L.7; 11/22/13 Tr., p.3, L.10-p.4, L.10; R .. pp.30, 35.) Notably, the plea
agreement did not mention restitution

(R., pp.28-38.) At sentencing, the district court

followed the plea agreement and sentenced Mr. Keys to a withheld judgment. ( 11 /22/13

1

, p.8, L23 - p.11, L.13; R., pp.57-60.)

Restitution was not discussed during the

hearing. 1 (See generally, 11/22/13 Tr.)
Six months after the judgment

conviction was entered,

State filed an

affidavit for restitution which attached a receipt from the Crime Victims Compensation
Fund (hereinafter, CVCF) requesting restitution in the amount of $1,008.00 for
counseling provided to Mrs. Keys. (R., pp.64-67.)
Thereafter, the district court ordered restitution. 2 (R., pp.68-70.) Five months
later, Mr. Keys moved the district court to set aside the restitution order. (R., pp.71-72.)
Mr. Keys asserted that the district court did not have jurisdiction to order restitution as
restitution was not contemplated by the parties to the binding I.C.R. 11 (f)(1 )(C) plea
agreement, and the State was not following the terms of the plea agreement when it
filed the affidavit and proposed order. (R.. pp.71-72.) The State objected to Mr. Keys'
motion to set aside restitution, and asserted that because Mr. Keys failed to timely
object to the order of restitution, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Mr. Keys' motion to set aside restitution order.

(R., pp.73-74.)

In its accompanying

memorandum, the State argued that even where the plea bargain is silent on the issue
of restitution, it does not preclude the victim's ability to claim restitution. (R., pp.73-86.)
After hearing the arguments of counsel at the hearing on Mr. Keys' motion to set aside
the restitution order, the district court relied on State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758 (2010),

After pronouncing Mr. Keys' sentence, the district court specifically asked the
prosecutor, "is there anything else that you want the court to consider." (11/22/13
Tr., p.11, Ls.13-14.) The prosecutor responded no, and reminded the court of the no
contact provision. (11/22/13Tr., p.11, Ls.15-16.)
2 The assigned district court judge had changed between the entry of the order of
probation filed on November 26, 2013, and the order of restitution, filed May 14, 2014.
(R., pp.57-70.)
1

2

to hold that the statute governing restitution orders expressly confers jurisdiction on a
to order restitution beyond the date of
set aside

; the court denied the motion

finality
restitution

the judgment of
(11/26/14

Tr., p.11, L.14-p.12, L.12; R., pp.89-91.)
Mr. Keys then filed a motion to reconsider and a notice of appeal timely from the
order denying the motion to set aside the restitution order. (R., pp.92-97.) In his motion
to reconsider, Mr. Keys asked the district court to reconsider its decision because the
court's order denying the motion was based on a term of probation and not a term of the
withheld judgment, and because there was no finding by the district court that the delay
in requesting restitution was reasonably necessary.

(R., pp.92-93.)

Mr. Keys also

asserted that the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter the restitution order, and
that the terms of the plea agreement were not followed when the State filed the affidavit
and proposed order for restitution. (R., p.92.) The State objected, and argued that the
Court of Appeals, in State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659 (Ct App. 2002) and State v.
Weaver, 158 Idaho 167 (Ct. App. 2014), held that the district court has continuing
jurisdiction over a case as it relates to restitution matters until the defendant is
discharged from probation. (R., pp.98-100; 12/23/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-7.)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Keys' motion to reconsider.

(See

generally, 12/23/14 Tr.) After the hearing, the district court granted the motion and set
aside the restitution order because it found restitution was not contemplated by the
terms of the plea agreement or made a part of the sentence, and, alternatively, because
there was no indication that the six month delay was necessary to compute the amount
of restitution.

(R., pp.102-105.) Thereafter, Mr. Keys withdrew his notice of appeal and

3

State filed a notice of appeal. (R.,
20, 2015.

107-114.) Mr. Keys' appeal was dismissed on

, p. 1

4

ISSUE
district

erred in

5

was improperly

ARGUMENT
The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Finding Restitution Was
Improperly Ordered
Introduction
the restitution order was improperly granted

The district court correctly found

where the district court did not find, and the State did not show, that it was necessary to
award restitution at such a late date.

The district court properly granted Mr. Keys'

motion to reconsider and setting aside the restitution order.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "when reviewing a trial court's decision

to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing court utilizes the same
standard of review used by the lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration.
For a district court, the standard of review on a motion to reconsider is "the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered."

Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 (2012).

That is, if the

original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, so too is the decision to
grant or deny the motion for reconsideration

Id. Finally, the district court must consider

any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory
order. Id.
The decision whether to order restitution is discretionary. State v. Gonzales, 144
Idaho 775, 777 (Ct. App. 2007).

"It is generally recognized, however, that courts of

criminal jurisdiction have no power or authority to direct reparations or restitution to a
crime victim in the absence of a statutory provision to such effect." Id. Thus, a district

6

court's exercise of discretion in ordering restitution must be within the limitations set
in I

§ 19-5304. Id. On appeal,

factual findings of the district court will not be

if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 1

Idaho 882,

885 (2013). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion

C.

Id.

The District Court Correctly Found That Restitution Was Improperly Ordered
The district court properly determined that, because there had been no mention

of restitution at sentencing, and there was no finding that it was necessary to extend the
time allowable for restitution claims past the date of the sentencing, its order of
restitution was improper. On appeal, the State claims that the district court mistakenly
believed it did not have jurisdiction to enter a restitution order (Respondent's Brief, p.7);
however, this was not the conclusion of the district court in its order granting Mr. Keys'
motion for reconsideration. In its order, the district court correctly noted that I.C. § 195304(6) requires restitution orders to be entered by the district court at the time of
sentencing. (R., p.103.) The district court further noted that a restitution order can be
entered post-sentencing only if the district court determines the delay is "necessary to
gather information so as to locate all victims and correctly compute the amount of
restitution." (R., p.103.) The district court then correctly concluded that it did not have
the statutory authority to order restitution because restitution was not ordered at
sentencing and there had been no indication that the additional six months was
necessary to compute the amount of restitution. (R., p.104.)
Idaho Code Section 19-5304(6) establishes a time frame during which the district
court may entertain a request for restitution

7

State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762

App. 2010). Idaho Code Section 19-5304(6) requires that restitution orders shall be
time
"

sentencing or such later date as deemed necessary by the

statutory provision thus allows the district court to delay entering a

restitution order until the parties have had the opportunity to marshal their evidence and
present their request for restitution or opposition thereto.

See Jensen, 149 Idaho at

762. The section also "contemplates that the court may need to grant the prosecution a
reasonable amount of time necessary to gather information so as to locate all victims
and correctly compute the amount of restitution." Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762 (quoting
Ferguson, 138 Idaho at 662) (emphasis in original).
In State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659 (Ct App. 2002), the Idaho Court of Appeals
noted that the key word in this section of the restitution statute is "necessary," and
vacated the trial court's restitution award because the State had failed to show it was
"necessary" to put off the entry of the order of restitution, and the district court lacked
authority to reopen the case after the defendant had been discharged from probation.
Id. at 662.

The Court held that, before the district court can order restitution post-

sentencing, the State must demonstrate that the delay was necessary and the district
court must make a finding that such delay was necessary.

Id.; State v. Jensen, 149

Idaho 758, 763 (Ct App. 2010). Otherwise, the district court exceeds its authority under
I.C. § 19-5304(6). Jensen, 149 Idaho at 763.
In the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, the district court
relied on the Idaho Court of Appeals' holdings in Ferguson and Jensen in holding that
the district court exceeded its authority in awarding restitution where the State failed to
demonstrate the delay was necessary.

(R., pp.102-105.)
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The court was correct in

finding that there had been no indication that a six month delay was necessary where
over six months elapsed before it filed an

proffered no justification as to

Further, the district court did not make any

attesting to restitution for the

findings as to why the State delayed seeking restitution for over six months.
Specifically, the district court did not make any findings that it was "necessary" to put off
the entry of the order of restitution for six months past the date of sentencing.
Further, there is no indication that the restitution requested for Mrs. Keys'
counseling was in any way caused by or related to Mr. Keys' crime.

(R., pp.64-67.)

The supporting documentation lacks dates as to when the counseling was provided and
contains no indication whatsoever that the counseling was necessitated by Mr. Keys'
illegal acts. 3 (R., pp. 64-67.) The evidence submitted in support of the motion included
an affidavit from the prosecutor in which he concluded that the CVCF was owed
$1,008.00, and a copy of a letter from the CVCF indicating that it was "requesting
restitution for payments made on behalf of Gloria Keys." (R., pp.64-67.)
Here, there was no restitution requested until six months after Mr. Keys was
sentenced, the State offered no explanation as to why the six month delay was
necessary, and the district court made no finding that extending the statutory period
within which restitution may be ordered six months past the sentencing date was
"necessary".

Thus, the district court correctly concluded that its Order of Restitution

was entered erroneously.

Idaho case law is clear that the restitution statute does not authorize an award of
restitution for future counseling. State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 629 (Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that the CVCF was not experiencing any present or existent suffering due to
the payment of expense of victims because no money had yet been paid out at the time
of request for restitution). Restitution for victim counseling that was not caused by the
defendant's crime is impermissible. State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808 (2002).
3

9

CONCLUSION
Keys respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the

DATED this 27 th day of October, 2015.

SALL J. COOLEY
Deputy State App ate Public Defender
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